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中国管理科学 ›› 2022, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (7): 264-275.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0239

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑消费者退货的制造商入侵策略研究

黄甫1,2, 宋华明2, 杨慧2, 吕一帆2, 吴佳伟2, 张哲2   

  1. 1.惠州学院经济管理学院,广东 惠州516007; 2.南京理工大学经济管理学院,江苏 南京210094
  • 收稿日期:2019-02-23 修回日期:2019-12-12 出版日期:2022-08-05 发布日期:2022-08-05
  • 通讯作者: 宋华明(1968-),男(汉族),江苏新沂人,南京理工大学经济管理学院,教授,博士后,博士生导师,研究方向:生产运作管理、物流与供应链管理,Email:Huaming@njust.edu.cn. E-mail:Huaming@njust.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571102);广东省哲学社会科学规划资助项目(GD20CGL38);惠州学院教博资助项目(2020JB019,2020JB020,2020JB073)

Research on Encroachment with Product Returns

HUANG Fu1,2, SONG Hua-ming2, YANG Hui2, LV Yi-fan2, WU Jia-wei2, ZHANG Zhe2   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management,Huizhou University, Huizhou 516007, China;2. School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science & Technology, Nanjing 210094, China
  • Received:2019-02-23 Revised:2019-12-12 Online:2022-08-05 Published:2022-08-05
  • Contact: 宋华明 E-mail:Huaming@njust.edu.cn

摘要: 在考虑消费者退货的情形下,通过构建包括一个制造商、一个零售商和消费者的二级供应链模型,研究了订货量决策以及制造商开通直销渠道的问题。分析提供退款保证和决策顺序对均衡结果以及制造商开通直销渠道的影响。研究发现:在单一渠道供应链中,提供退款保证提高销量,制造商和零售商利润以及消费者剩余;在不提供退款保证情形下,制造商利润和零售商利润都随零售满意度递增;在提供退款保证情形下,制造商利润和零售商利润都随零售满意度先递减后递增;当直销渠道的成本较高时,制造商将不开通直销渠道;提供退款保证有利于制造商开通直销渠道。在双渠道供应链中:在顺序决策情形下,直销量随零售满意度递增,然而在同时决策情形下,直销量却随零售满意度递减;提供退款保证虽然降低零售商利润但能够提高消费者剩余,零售商利润随直销成本递增,在提供退款保证情形下,制造商利润和总利润随直销成本先递减后递增;当零售满意度较高,且直销成本也较高时,提供退款保证使制造商和零售商“双输”,当零售满意度较高,但直销成本较低时,提供退款保证使制造商和零售商达到(win-lose)。

关键词: 退款保证;直销市场;制造商入侵;订货量决策;消费者剩余

Abstract: The optimal quantity in a two-level supply chain model consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer and consumer considering money-back guarantees is studied.The effects of money-back guarantees and decision sequence on equilibrium results, threshold of adding direct channel are analyzed. By the comparison analysis, it is found that in a single retail channel supply chain, compared to not offering money back guarantees, offering money back guarantees not only increases total sales, manufacturer profit and consumer surplus, but also increases retailer profit. Offering money back guarantees enables manufacturer, retailer and consumers achieve “three wins”. In the dual-channel supply chain, whether it is a sequential decision or a simultaneous decision, offering money back guarantees always reduces the retailer’s profit, and the retailer’s profit increases with the direct sales cost; offering money back guarantees increases the direct sales volume and the total sales volume. Direct sales volume and total sales volume decrease with direct sales cost, manufacturer's profit and total profit decrease first and then increase with direct sales cost; in the case of sequential decision-making, direct sales volume increases with retail satisfaction, but in the case of simultaneous decision-making, direct sales volume decreases with retail satisfaction. When retail satisfaction is high and direct selling costs are low, offering money back guarantees can improve manufacturer profit, but when retail satisfaction is high and direct selling costs are high, offering money back guarantees reduces manufacturer profit.

Key words: money-back guarantees; direct market; encroachment; quantity decision

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