零售商主导型供应链中的知情委托方赊销契约机制设计

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.11.009

中国管理科学 ›› 2017, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (11): 85-93.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.11.009

零售商主导型供应链中的知情委托方赊销契约机制设计

鄢仁秀^1,2, 汪贤裕²

1. 成都理工大学核技术与自动化工程学院四川成都 610059;
2. 四川大学商学院, 四川成都 610064

收稿日期:2015-01-21 修回日期:2016-12-22 出版日期:2017-11-20 发布日期:2018-01-31
通讯作者: 汪贤裕(1947-),男(汉族),江苏苏州人,四川大学商学院教授,博士生导师,研究方向:激励理论、博弈论等,E-mail:372151486@qq.com E-mail:372151486@qq.com
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71502037，71501019）；教育部人文社科青年基金项目（15YJC630149，14YJC630020，14YJC630187）；四川省教育厅人文社科一般项目（16SB0075）；成都理工大学机械工程专业教学创新团队项目（10912-JXTD201501）

Trade Credit Contracts Design by an Informed Principal in Retailer-dominant Supply Chain

YAN Ren-xiu^1,2, WANG Xian-yu²

1. College of Applied Nuclear Technology and Automation Engineering, Chengdu University of Technology, Chengdu 610059, China;
2. Business School, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610064, China

Received:2015-01-21 Revised:2016-12-22 Online:2017-11-20 Published:2018-01-31

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为了研究供应链赊销交易中知情委托方向代理方进行信号显示的问题，考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的二级供应链，双方进行赊销交易。零售商作为核心企业，拥有销售能力的私人信息。基于显示原理，首先设计了具有激励性质且保证供应商单独可获利的低信息密度最优配置，并分析了博弈的完美贝叶斯均衡。结果表明，知情零售商通过提供低信息密度最优配置向供应商传递信号，但存在信号成本，具体表现为：契约呈现"低端不扭曲，高端向上扭曲"特性；且对高能力零售商的初始资金有门槛要求。其次，通过分析知情零售商提供的事中有效配置发现，当供应商对零售商所属类型的信念满足一定条件时，低信息密度最优是事中有效的，此时博弈存在唯一的完美贝叶斯均衡。否则，由事中有效确定的均衡配置集弱帕累托占优于低信息密度最优；高能力零售商的信号传递成本相对降低，具体表现为："高端向上扭曲"的程度相对较低，且向供应商提供初始资金的门槛要求也更低。本文的研究对供应链管理中，知情委托方的赊销契约设计问题提供了一定的理论基础和实践指导。

关键词: 赊销, 知情委托方, 机制设计, 低信息密度最优, 事中有效, 完美贝叶斯均衡

Abstract: Mechanism design by an informed principal needs to take into account the informational leakage taking place when offering a contract to the agent. In this paper, the problem of contract design by an informed principal under trade credit in supply chain is investigated. More specifically, a supply chain consisting of a risk-neural supplier and a risk-neural retailer is considered. As the core enterprise, the retailer finances the inventory using trade credit from the supplier. By the Revelation Principle, we design the low-information-intensity optimum allocation (LⅡ) with incentive compatibility is designed, to realize the informational leakage to the supplier, and avoid the imitation between different types of retailers. By means of the mechanism way of deriving the equilibrium applied by Tirole, it is found that under the weak monotonic profit assumption, the separating allocation is the LⅡ. It's also shown that to sign the true type to the supplier, the optimal contracts for the retailer with higher ability entails an upward distortion, which causes signaling cost. And the degree of distortion decreases with the increase of the retailer's initial capital. Meanwhile, the contracts have restrictions of the initial capital. Furthermore, the interim-efficient allocation (IE) is presented to analyze the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the game. It can be shown that the LⅡ is the unique PBE for certain supplier's ax ante belief. Otherwise, the set of equilibrium payoffs for the two types of retailers weakly Pareto-dominate the LⅡ. And the (IE) still present the same distorted characteristic as the LⅡ, but has lower restrictions on the retailer's initial capital. Our research will provide some theoretical basis and practical guidance for the mechanism design by an informed principal under trade credit in supply chain.

Key words: trade credit, informed principal, mechanism design, low-information-intensity optimum, interim-efficient, perfect Bayesian equilibrium

中图分类号:

鄢仁秀, 汪贤裕. 零售商主导型供应链中的知情委托方赊销契约机制设计[J]. 中国管理科学, 2017, 25(11): 85-93.

YAN Ren-xiu, WANG Xian-yu. Trade Credit Contracts Design by an Informed Principal in Retailer-dominant Supply Chain[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2017, 25(11): 85-93.

参考文献

[1] Goyal S K. Economic order quantity under conditions of permissible delay in payments[J]. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 1988, 39(3):322-323.

[2] Chen S C, Teng J T. Retailer's economic order quantity when the supplier offers conditionally permissible delay in payments link to order quantity[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2014, 155:284-291.

[3] 秦娟娟. 时变供需下基于商业信用的零售商最优订货策略[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(3):89-98.

[4] Lee C H, Rhee B D. Coordination contracts in the presence of positive inventory financing costs[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2010, 124(2):331-339.

[5] Lee C H, Rhee B D. Trade credit for supply chain coordination[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2011, 214(1):136-146.

[6] Chen Xiangfeng, Wang Anyu. Trade credit contract with limited liability in the supply chain with budget constraints[J]. Annals of Operations Research, 2012, 196(1):153-165.

[7] 张义刚, 唐小我. 延迟支付下短生命周期产品批发价契约研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2011, 19(3):63-69.

[8] 刚号, 唐小我, 慕银平. 零售商主导下融资服务对采购合同的影响[J]. 系统工程, 2013, 31(4):32-36.

[9] Mahata G C, Mahata P. Analysis of a fuzzy economic order quantity model for deteriorating items under retailer partial trade credit financing in a supply chain[J]. Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 2011, 53(9):1621-1636.

[10] Chen Fangruo. Auctioning supply contracts[J]. Management Science, 2007, 53(10):1562-1576.

[11] Özer, Raz G. Supply chain sourcing under asymmetric information[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2011, 20(1):92-115.

[12] Cakanyildirim M, Feng Qi, Gan Xianghua, et al. Contracting and coordination under asymmetric production cost information[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2012, 21(2):345-360.

[13] Wang J C, Lau H S, Lau A H L. When should a manufacturer share truthful manufacturing cost information with a dominant retailer[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2009, 197(1):266-286.

[14] Wang J C, Lau A H L, Lau H S. Practical and effective contracts for the dominant retailer of a newsvendor product with price-sensitive demand[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2012, 138(1):46-54.

[15] 徐晓燕,吴三平. 生产成本信息不对称的两级供应链协调研究[J]. 系统工程学报,2009, 24(1):18-24.

[16] 曹二保,赖明勇. 信息不对称的委托销售合约[J]. 系统管理学报, 2009, 18(2):199-202.

[17] 颜波, 刘艳萍, 李鸿媛. 成本信息不对称下零售商主导的混合渠道供应链决策分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2015, 23(12):124-134.

[18] Maskin E, Tirole J. The principal-agent relationship with an informed principal:The case of private values[J]. Econometrica,1990, 58(2):379-409.

[19] Maskin E, Tirole J. The principal-agent relationship with an informed principal, Ⅱ:Common values[J]. Econometrica, 1992, 60(1):1-42.

[20] 鄢仁秀, 汪贤裕. 非对称信息下供应链赊销交易中的最优契约机制[J].软科学, 2014, 28(12):16-49, 94.

[21] Perakis G, Roels G. Regret in the newsvendor model with partial information[J]. Operations Research, 2008, 56(1):188-203.

[22] Tirole J. The theory of corporate finance[M]. Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2010.

零售商主导型供应链中的知情委托方赊销契约机制设计

Trade Credit Contracts Design by an Informed Principal in Retailer-dominant Supply Chain

PDF (PC)

可视化

摘要/Abstract

引用本文

使用本文

参考文献

相关文章 12

Metrics

本文评价

推荐阅读 10

[1]	唐国锋, 艾兴政, 但斌, 李丹. 效率参数不可观测下的SaaS云外包合约研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2018, 26(2): 25-32.
[2]	丁涛, 吴华清, 梁樑. 360度评估体系中权重调整方法研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(7): 149-154.
[3]	卢允照, 刘树林. 信息不对称下可分公共物品的拍卖研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(3): 141-148.
[4]	姚树俊, 陈菊红, 和征. 产品服务系统转移支付机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(2): 84-91.
[5]	张雪峰. 土地使用权机制的实现与执行[J]. 中国管理科学, 2015, 23(12): 71-76.
[6]	武康平, 张雪峰, 倪丽洁. 国有土地拍卖机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(6): 141-148.
[7]	马本江, 徐笔武, 徐晨. 带保修期的寿命型产品多属性招标采购机制设计——以大型医疗设备为例[J]. 中国管理科学, 2013, 21(4): 112-120.
[8]	郎艳怀 . 非对称信息和弹性需求下的供应链激励机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2012, 20(5): 106-111.
[9]	但斌, 唐国锋, 宋寒 . 成本信息不对称下的应用服务外包菜单式合约[J]. 中国管理科学, 2012, 20(5): 142-151.
[10]	黄河, 陈剑, 徐鸿雁. 多因素采购组合拍卖动态机制设计研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2008, 16(1): 104-110.
[11]	陈洁, 王方华. 基于卡特尔模型的营销渠道分销商联盟机制设计[J]. 中国管理科学, 2006, (1): 56-60.
[12]	彭小兵, 蒲勇健. 商业银行信息披露监控机制的构建研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2003, (3): 83-87.