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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2017, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (4): 33-41.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.04.005

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

分销供应链中零售商横向竞争下采购联盟的稳定结构

肖旦1, 周永务2, 欣向3, 昌文4   

  1. 1. 广州大学工商管理学院, 广东 广州 510006;
    2. 华南理工大学工商管理学院, 广东 广州 510640;
    3. 中山大学粤港澳发展研究院, 广东 广州 510275;
    4. 淮北师范大学信息学院, 安徽 淮北 235000
  • 收稿日期:2015-09-07 修回日期:2016-05-30 出版日期:2017-04-20 发布日期:2017-06-29
  • 通讯作者: 史欣向(1981-),男(汉族),陕西西安人,中山大学粤港奥发展研究院、自贸区综合研究院,院长助理,副研究员,研究方向:公司治理、技术创新,E-mail:shixx3@mail.sysu.edu.cn. E-mail:shixx3@mail.sysu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目（71131003）；广东省自然科学基金资助项目（2014A030310443）；教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目（15YJC630138，15YJC630053）；安徽省高等学校自然科学研究重点项目（KJ2015A335）；广州市科技计划项目（201510010149）

Stable Structure of Purchasing Coalitions with Horizontal Competing Retailers in Distribution Supply Chains

XIAO Dan1, ZHOU Yong-wu2, SHI Xin-xiang3, LI Chang-wen4   

  1. 1. School of Business Administration, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, China;
    2. School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510640, China;
    3. Institute of Guangdong Hong Kong and Macao Development Studies, Sun Yat-sen University Guangzhou 510275, China;
    4. Information College, Huaibei Normal University, Huaibei 235000, China
  • Received:2015-09-07 Revised:2016-05-30 Online:2017-04-20 Published:2017-06-29

PDF (PC)

932

被引次数

7

摘要： 本文针对由单一供应商和三个横向竞争零售商所组成的两层分销供应链系统，采用合作博弈论中描述远视参与者的最大一致集（LCS）概念，在供应商所提供的不同契约形式下，分别研究了横向竞争零售商采购联盟的远视稳定结构。研究发现，当供应商提供线性折扣契约时，根据供应商提供的折扣比例不同，横向竞争零售商的采购联盟结构是不同的，当折扣比例较低（小于0.5）时，横向竞争的零售商会形成仅两个零售商联合采购的联盟结构，将第三个零售商排除在联盟之外；而当折扣比例较高（大于0.5）时，横向竞争的远视零售商将只会形成大联盟，以增强共同的竞争力。但是，当供应商提供两部收费制折扣契约时，无论供应商所提供的折扣比例如何变化，横向竞争零售商都以三个零售商联合采购的大联盟为稳定结构。此外，通过数值例子发现，供应商提供其他形式的数量折扣契约时，横向竞争的远视零售商会以大联盟为稳定结构。

关键词: 分销供应链, 合作博弈论, 采购联盟, 远视零售商

Abstract: Purchasing plays a very important role in the practical operations for some companies. Many companies will purchase jointly in order to reduce the operational cost. Although many purchasing coalitions collaborate on the procurement, they still compete in other fields such as order quantity or price. Therefore, there is an interesting problem needed to solve, that is, how the farsighted stable structure of purchasing coalitions will be. In a two-echelon distribution supply chain formed by a single supplier and three competing retailers, the farsighted stable structure of purchasing coalition among retailers is analyzed by using the concept of farsighted largest consistent set(LCS) in the cooperative game theory under different discount schedules. It is found that the stable structure of competing retailers' purchasing coalition depends on the discount scale when the supplier provides a linear discount schedule. If the discount scale is low (less than 0.5), horizontal competing retailers will form a two-retailer purchasing coalition, the third retailer will be ruled, and if the discount scale is higher (more than 0.5), horizontal competing retailers will form the grand purchasing coalition, in order to enhance the competitiveness. However, when the supplier provides a two-part tariff discount schedule, the stable structure is always the grand purchasing coalition regardless of discount scale. In addition, it is also found that the grand coalition will be the stable structure for the farsighted retailers under other discount schedules by the numerical examples. This paper will provide some reasonable and operational suggestions for farsighted retailers form coalitions.

Key words: distribution supply chains, cooperative game, purchasing coalition, farsighted retailers

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