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中国管理科学 ›› 2016, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (8): 28-36.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.08.004

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于阶段划分的企业主动碳减排创新策略实施研究

程发新, 邵世玲   

  1. 江苏大学管理学院, 江苏 镇江 212013
  • 收稿日期:2015-01-23 修回日期:2015-10-28 出版日期:2016-08-20 发布日期:2016-08-24
  • 通讯作者: 程发新(1966-),男(汉族),甘肃张掖人,江苏大学管理学院教授,博士,研究方向:低碳运营管理、群体决策方法与应用,E-mail:chengfaxin@163.com. E-mail:chengfaxin@163.com
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71273118,71171099);国家自然科学基金面上资助项目(71473107)

The Study of Innovation Strategy in the Stage of Active Carbon Reduction Based on Stage Division

CHENG Fa-xin, SHAO Shi-ling   

  1. School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China
  • Received:2015-01-23 Revised:2015-10-28 Online:2016-08-20 Published:2016-08-24

摘要: 基于环境策略在被动阶段和主动阶段的不同,且一些企业已启动主动减排阶段的产品创新策略。本文在碳减排阶段划分的基础上,对企业主动碳减排创新策略实施进行研究,引入碳排放交易制度及政府补贴激励,构建了政策驱动下的企业主动碳减排成本收益模型和行业成本收益模型。以矩阵正定性判定企业碳减排是否存在最优策略,同时探讨该最优策略能否实现行业帕累托最优以及如何实现。研究表明,企业主动碳减排创新策略存在最优,企业对碳减排策略的投入随着其相应减排效果系数、减排收益系数与碳排放交易下政府超额补贴系数的增加而加大;行业实现帕累托最优需要政府激励政策引导,且碳排放交易下政府超额补贴系数为行业内定值,随行业内各企业减排效果与创新收益的增加而减少。此外,根据实地调研和相关文献的数据,对模型中的各项参数进行赋值,并以水泥企业为例,通过典型算例分析和关键参数灵敏度分析进行模型有效性验证。算例分析结果证实了创新收益和政府碳排放交易下的补贴激励是企业主动碳减排的关键因素。本文从阶段划分的视角对碳减排问题进行尝试性研究,可为企业主动碳减排创新策略的实施提供决策依据,同时也为政府政策制定提供参考。此外在政府引导企业碳减排帕累托改进过程中,应保障企业碳减排效率在同一水平,创新力较强的企业,减排量相应较大,从而实现碳减排的帕累托最优。

关键词: 阶段划分, 主动碳减排, 政府政策, 帕累托最优

Abstract: The environmental policy in passive and active phases is different,and some enterprises have started product innovation strategy in the stage of active carbon reduction stage.On the basis of theory of stage division, an exploratory study on innovation strategies in the stage of active carbon reduction is conducted carbon emissions trading and government subsidies constructed are introduced, a Cost-benefit model of enterprises and industry active carbon reduction is, whether there is an optimal strategy is determined by matri positive definiteness, and wether this strategy can realize Pareto optimality and how.The result shows an optimal carbon reduction strategy, enterprises investment in which increases with the increase of corresponding emission reduction effect coefficient, reduction benefit coefficient, and government extra subsidy coefficient on the carbon emissions trading; realization of industrial Pareto optimality needs the subsidy, and the extra subsidy coefficient is an industrial default value, which declines with the increase of enterprises emission reduction effect coefficient and innovation revenue coefficient.Values are assigned for the parameters in the model based on field research and related literature data,and cement industry is taken as an example to validate the model, sensitivity analysis of key parameters is also completed. Example analysis confirms the benefits of innovation and the subsidies are the key factors for enterprises initiative carbon reduction. The results will provide a basis for enterprises selection of optimal initiative carbon reduction strategy and reference for government's fiscal policy. Furthermore, it indicates that government should ensure efficiency of carbon emissions at the same level in the process of Pareto improvement of enterprises carbon-reduction and the enterprises with strong innovation ability should correspond larger emission reduction to achieve Pareto optimality of carbon reduction.

Key words: stage division, active carbon reduction, government policy, Pareto optimality

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